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Divine Hiddenness or ​De Jure​ Objections to Theism: You Can't Have Both 
 
1. Introduction 
De facto ​objections to theism purport to show that theism is false, whereas ​de jure 
objections to theism claim that whether or not theism is true, belief in God is irrational. Divine 
hiddenness​―​the (supposed) fact that there are people who non-resistantly lack belief in God​―​is 
sometimes used as an argument against theism. In this article, I show that accepting the argument 
from divine hiddenness carries a high cost: it eliminates all ​de jure ​objections to theism. So, 
atheists can either have ​de jure ​objections to theism or the objection from divine hiddenness, but 
they can’t have both. 
 
2. Divine Hiddenness 
God, let’s assume, is all powerful, all knowing, and perfectly loving. If God exists, it may 
(to some) seem surprising that there are people that non-resistantly do not believe he exists. 
Some have tried to exploit this purported fact​―that some non-resistantly lack belief in God―​to 
motivate atheism. This is called the argument from divine hiddenness. In its traditional form, the 
argument from divine hiddenness claims that if God exists, then, ​necessarily​, there will not be 
any (finite) persons that non-resistantly do not believe he exists (e.g. J.L. Schellenberg 1993, 
 
2015 and 2016). This is because, ​necessarily​, God​―​since he is perfectly loving​―​would be open 
to being in a conscious, interactive, positively meaningful and reciprocal relationship  with all 1
those who want to be in a relationship with him, and if one is open to being in a relationship with 
another, then he will ensure that that person ​believes ​he exists, since one cannot be in a 
relationship with another without believing he exists.  Schellenberg puts forth an abbreviated 2
version of the argument as follows: 
 
God, if he is perfectly loving...will always be open to being in a personal 
relationship with any finite person. However, if this is the case, then no finite 
person will ever non[-]resistantly not believe that God exists​―​if a person does 
not believe in God, it will be due to her resistance to God. But the non-belief of 
some persons is non[-]resistant, and so God does not exist. (2015: 103) 
 
Suffice it to say very few are convinced that the argument in this form is successful: there have 
been many (more or less) plausible suggestions for why God, while being perfectly loving, ​at 
least possibly ​allows non-resistant non-belief (if any there be). (See e.g. Dustin Crummett 
(2015), Travis Dumsday (2010) and (2012), Daniel Howard-Snyder (2016) and Kirk Lougheed 
(2018).) However, one need not state the argument in such strong terms: if stated 
1 Hereafter, I will usually speak of God being open to being in a ​relationship​, by which I shall mean a conscious, 
reciprocal, etc. relationship. 
2 However, see Andrew Cullison (2010) for a challenge to the thesis that belief is necessary for a relationship. Since 
the advocate of the argument from divine hiddenness must reject Cullison’s view, I will not consider it here. Instead, 
I will grant, for the sake of argument, that Cullison is wrong. 
 
probabilistically, its plausibility is increased. For example, one might argue that if God exists, 
then ​probably ​there would not be non-resistant non-belief. (But ​s​ee Bergmann (2001), McBrayer 
and Swenson (2012) and Tabor and McNabb (2018) for challenges to probabilistic formulations 
of the argument.) Felipe Leon does just this, and states his probabilistic version of it as follows:  
 
1. If [God] exists, then we’d expect that God would meet all the prerequisites for all those 
who would want a voluntary relationship with him. 
2. One of the prerequisites is to let others...reasonably believe...if they wish, that he exists. 
3. But this condition hasn’t been met: there are non[-]resistant non-believers. By contrast, 
we ​would ​expect the data of non[-]resistant non-belief if naturalism were true. For on that 
hypothesis, there is no God that is seeking a relationship with us. 
4. Therefore, [non-resistant non-belief] provide[s] some evidence against [God].  3
(Rasmussen and Leon 2019: 207, see also Graham Oppy 2013: 83-85) 
 
Undergirding the argument from divine hiddenness, in both its probabilistic and traditional 
formulation, is the thought that God’s perfect love entails that he would (at least) probably seek 
to be in a relationship with all those who are capable and not resistant to being in a relationship 
with him, and that to be in a relationship with God one must believe he exists. So, God will (at 
least) probably ensure that those seeking a relationship with him believe that he exists 
(Schellenberg 2015: 59-60). This entails the following thesis: 
3 This statement mirrors Draper’s (1989) version of the evidential argument from evil, in which he discusses the 
likelihood of the distribution of pain and pleasure we find in our world relative to theism and naturalism. 
 
 (H) God probably would either (a) directly cause (among the non-resistant) belief 
in him or (b) provide the non-resistant with an ability to form beliefs about him. 
 
If one rejects (H), then it’s hard to see how the argument from divine hiddenness, in either its 
probabilistic or traditional form, could be sustained; if (H) is false, then it’s ​not ​to be expected 
that God would ensure those who are non-resistant reasonably believe that he exists​. This is 
because if one does not have an ​ability ​to form beliefs about God, then he will not have any 
beliefs at all about God―unless, of course, God directly causes one to believe he exists, but this 
does not happen given ~(H). ​So, I will take it that if one accepts the argument from divine 
hiddenness, then she must accept (H). 
 
3. The Cost of Divine Hiddenness 
Alvin Plantinga (2000 and 2015) has argued that if God exists, then belief in God is 
probably rational.  From his mouth, the argument goes like this: 4
 
[I]f theistic belief is true, then it seems likely that it does have warrant. If it is true, 
then there is, indeed, such a person as God, a person who has created us in his 
image (so that we resemble him, among other things, in having the capacity for 
knowledge), who loves us, who desires that we know and love him, and who is 
4 He further argues that belief in God would probably be epistemically warranted and thus amount to ​knowledge​. I 
mention only rationality for the sake of brevity. 
 
such that it is our end and good to know and love him. But if these things are so, 
then he would of course intend that we be able to be aware of his presence and to 
know something about him. And if that is so, the natural thing to think is that he 
created us in such a way that we would come to hold such true beliefs as that 
there is such a person as God, that he is our creator, that we owe him obedience 
and worship, that he is worthy of worship, that he loves us, and so on. And if that 
is so, then the natural thing to think is that the cognitive processes that do produce 
belief in God are aimed by their designer at producing that belief. But then the 
belief in question will be produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly 
according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth: it will therefore have 
warrant [and therefore be rational]. (2000: 189-190) 
 
The basic idea here is that if God exists, then he has created us in his image, desires for 
us to know him and various truths about him (that we owe him worship, etc.), and this 
means that God would probably have created us with an ability to know him and various 
truths about him. More simply, Plantinga says that  
 
[I]f God does exist, then theistic belief is probably not a result of cognitive 
systems gone awry or a loose screw. Rather, it is likely to be formed by 
properly functioning, reliable faculties. (2000: 189-190) 
 
We may simplify Plantinga’s thesis to this: 
 
 (P) If God exists, then theistic belief is probably formed by properly functioning, 
reliable faculties. 
 
Since beliefs formed by properly functioning, reliable faculties are ​warranted​, it follows that 
such beliefs will be rational.  And this means that belief in God will probably be rational if God 5
exists, since belief in God will probably be produced by a properly functioning and reliable 
faculty. The upshot here is significant: this does away with all pure ​de jure ​objections to theism; 
since the truth of theism entails its (probable) rationality, it eliminates all objections to the 
rationality of belief in God that are not also an objection to the existence of God. (While 
Plantinga’s argument appears to have been largely successful, see Andrew Moon (2017) and 
Evan Fales (2003) for challenges to it.) 
 
So far, we’ve seen that the argument from divine hiddenness is committed to (H) and that 
if (P) is true, then all ​de jure ​objections to theism are eliminated. In what follows, I will show 
that those that accept (H) must also accept (P), and hence those who accept the argument from 
divine hiddenness must reject all ​de jure ​objections to theism. 
 
Recall (H) and (P): 
5 This assumes the truth of epistemic externalism, and my argument in this article is framed within an externalist 
perspective. So, those who are not externalists can avoid the argument I give below. For defences of externalism, see 
Michael Bergmann (2006), Perry Hendricks (forthcoming), and Plantinga (1993).  
 
 (H) God probably would either (a) directly cause (among the non-resistant) belief 
in him or (b) provide the non-resistant with an ability to form beliefs about him. 
 
(P) If God exists, then theistic belief is probably formed by properly functioning, 
reliable faculties. 
 
The route from (H) to (P) is fairly simple: if (a) of (H) holds, then one’s belief in God 
will be formed reliably (God directly producing belief in him is, of course, completely 
reliable), and if (b) of (H) holds, then God has provided humans with an ability to form 
beliefs about him.  But the adherent of (H) must hold that the beliefs formed by the 6
ability God has provided humans with is reliable, since these beliefs need to form the 
basis of a conscious, reciprocal and positively meaningful relationship with God. In other 
words, a conscious, reciprocal and positively meaningful relationship with God ​requires 
one’s beliefs to be reliably formed: I must be able to recognize certain things about God, 
respond appropriately and so on, and this requires that my ‘God-belief forming ability’ is 
reliable. (See also Schellenberg 2015: 40.) ​Put differently: if God has given me an ability 
to form beliefs about him for the purpose of creating and maintaining a relationship with 
6(H) only refers to God ensuring that the ​non-resistant ​believe in him. So, it is compatible with ​resistant ​persons 
believing in him due to some other process. Since (H) does not ensure that other processes are reliable, (P) does not, 
strictly speaking, follow from it. To circumvent this issue, I shall make the (plausible) ​assumption that Pr(that one 
has non-resistant belief that God exists | theism) is far greater than Pr(that one has resistant belief that God exists | 
theism). 
 
him​, then the ability will be reliable, for otherwise it would not accomplish its purpose​. 
(The same, of course, goes for if the belief was caused directly by God.) So, it seems 
clear that (H) entails (P). However, if this is the case, then those who accept (H) must 
reject all ​de jure ​objections to theism: since (P) does away with all ​de jure ​objections to 
theism, and (H) entails (P), (H) does away with all such objections as well. Since 
proponents of the argument from divine hiddenness accept (H), it follows that they must 
reject all ​de jure ​objections to theism. And this means that the argument from divine 
hiddenness is ​costly ​for atheists.  7
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